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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kenneth D. Rawley appeals from the judgment entered upon the district 
court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury found Kenneth D. Rawley guilty of aggravated battery. (R., p. 179.) 
The district court sentenced Rawley to a term of 15 years with three years fixed. 
(R., p. 179.) On Rawley's appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. (R., p. 179.) 
Rawley filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting two claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (R., pp. 6-9, 78-84; Second Amended 
Petition; Third Amended Petition (Exhibit).) The state moved for summary 
dismissal, which the district court granted in a written opinion following hearing. 
(R., pp. 135-36, 178-85; 5/18/12 Tr.) Rawley timely appealed. (R., p. 187.) 
1 
ISSUES 
Rawley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the petitioner / appellant state a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his allegations 
that: 
A. Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to 
effective counsel when attorney Gary I. Amendola 
and attorney Julie L. Doty failed to investigate and 
interview all of the witnesses pertinent to petitioner's 
case; and 
8. Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to 
effective counsel when his attorney's [sic] failed to 
prepare for trial by not following through with 
interviewing what was a witness vital to the 
petitioner's case when the witness was disclosed at a 
pretrial conference four (4) days before the trial, and 
failing to request a continuance when Judge Verby 
offered said continuance so that the defense team 
could interview and investigate Marilyn Pearson, the 
witness. 
2. Did appellant's post-conviction attorney Isabella Robertson 
provide effective assistance of counsel when she failed to 
investigate and provide sufficient evidence to support 
appellant's post-conviction claims as required by I.C. § 19-
4903, as said evidence was readily available from the 
appellant, and from the record. 
3. Did appellant's post-conviction attorney Isabella Robertson 
provide effective assistance of counsel when she failed to 
bring forth the following issues in violation of appellant's due 
process rights, in having them heard, which if found in his 
favor would entitle appellant to the relief requested: 
A. That trial counsel refused to permit appellant to testify 
when that testimony would have been exculpatory; 
and 
8. That trial counsel failed to develop a sound trial 
strategy of self-defense in light of pretrial witness 
testimony; and 
C. Trial counsel failed to protect appellant's due process 
rights, in light of the inadequate police investigation, 
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evidence in support of appellant's conviction of 
aggravated battery cannot be fairly characterized as 
sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
D. That trial counsel failed to investigate and understand 
the statutes and the elements required to be found 
guilty of aggravated battery, as the evidence was 
insufficient to support appellant's conviction, for the 
requisite intent cannot be said to have been 
accomplished, in fact the evidence was more in 
support of the lesser included offense of 
misdemeanor battery; and 
E. Trial counsel failed to protect appellant's due process 
rights, as pertaining to the lack of objection to the 
state's witnesses being present in the court room 
prior to their individual testimony, where the 
prosecutor relied on that fact and had several 
witnesses recall testimony of the other witnesses 
which allowed for the state to cooberate [sic] the 
various testimonies. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) 
The state rephrases the issue(s) as: 
1. Has Rawley failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief? 
2. Is Rawley precluded from asserting ineffective assistance of post-




Rawley Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing 
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Rawley asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing his post-
conviction petition, arguing he stated a prima facie case of ineffective assistance 
by trial counsel. (Appellant's brief, p. 9.) However, Rawley fails to show reversal 
is warranted. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852,727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Rawley's Petition Failed To State A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact 
A claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material 
fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); State v. 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003). Although a court must 
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accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, it need not accept mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or conclusions of 
law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001 )). In this case, Rawley's petition 
claimed ineffective assistance by trial counsel. 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim Requires Demonstration 
Of Deficient Performance And Prejudice 
To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). With respect to deficient 
performance, a petitioner "must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 
787 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted). In considering an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the courts apply "a strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance." kl 
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." kl (citations 
and quotations omitted). "It is not enough to show that the errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding." kl Rather, "[c)ounsel's 
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errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable." Id. 
2. Other Than Conclusory Allegations, Rawley Failed To Allege Facts 
That, If True, Entitled Him To The Relief Requested 
In his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Rawley asserted his trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate or otherwise prepare for trial. (Third 
Amended Petition, pp. 4-7.) According to Rawley, counsel failed to interview 
between 24 and 4 7 witnesses who were pertinent to his case, and failed to 
adequately investigate Marilyn Pearson as a witness, before trial. (Id.) 
"[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 
ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy 
measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
However, "the duty to investigate does not force defense lawyers to scour the 
globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably diligent counsel may 
draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a 
waste." Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). 
As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Premo v. Moore, 131 
S.Ct. 733 (2011), citing Strickland, "The question is whether an attorney's 
representation amounted to incompetence under prevailing professional 
norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom." 
(Emphasis added.) See also Steele v. State, 153 Idaho 783, _, 291 P.3d 466, 
473 n.8 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting the petitioner's failure to "present any evidence 
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that his attorney's conduct was objectively unreasonable under prevailing 
professional norms"). 
To suNive dismissal, Rawley had to raise a genuine issue of fact that his 
counsel's failure to adequately investigate amounted to incompetence. Premo, 
131 S.Ct. 733. Mere conclusory allegations would not suffice. Workman, 144 
Idaho at 522, 164 P .3d at 802. As noted by the district court in its order 
dismissing Rawley's petition, "Strategic or tactical decisions made by trial 
counsel are not to be second-guessed on post-conviction review, unless those 
decisions are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." (R., pp. 
181-82 (citing Milton v. State, 126 Idaho 638, 641, 888 P.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(other citations omitted)).) 
In his petition, Rawley made no allegations to support objectively deficient 
performance by his trial counsel. Instead, the petition made conclusory 
allegations that counsel was ineffective, or otherwise second-guessed counsel's 
strategic decisions with benefit of hindsight. (Third Amended Petition, pp. 4-7.) 
The petition acknowledges that counsel inteNiewed three witnesses, and "made 
great noise about the prosecutor's behavior regarding witness Marilyn Pearson." 
(Third Amended Petition, pp. 4-5.) Counsel's decision to focus on three 
witnesses, given information in police reports, is entirely reasonable. (R., p. 
183.) As noted by the prosecution at hearing, counsel's trial strategy in not 
earlier pursuing Marilyn Pearson, or not continuing trial to further investigate her, 
was sound. (5/18/12 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 11-25.) That counsel could have employed 
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alternative strategies fails to show they were inadequately prepared, ignorant of 
relevant law, or otherwise objectively deficient. 
Even if Rawley had shown deficient performance, he utterly failed to 
establish prejudice. As observed by the district court, Rawley did not 
demonstrate that counsel failed to interview witnesses who actually saw the 
altercation, or who had any information that would have assisted in his defense. 
(R., p. 183.) Also, Rawley did not show how a continuance for more time to 
interview Pearson would have aided his defense. (R., p. 183.) The record 
supports the district court's conclusions that Rawley failed to show prejudice. 
In light of the strong presumption that counsel perform within an 
acceptable range of reasonableness, Rawley has failed to raise a genuine issue 
of fact that his trial counsel was ineffective. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787. 
Accordingly, Rawley has not shown the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
II. 
Rawley Is Precluded From Asserting Ineffective Assistance Of Post-Conviction 
Counsel For The First Time On Appeal 
Rawley's remaining claims assert ineffective assistance by his post-
conviction counsel. These issues were obviously not raised in Rawley's post-
conviction petition, and thus not addressed by the district court in the decision 
appealed here. The appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 58, 106 P.3d 376, 384 (2005). 
Therefore, the Court need not address these claims here. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Rawley's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 26th day of July, 2013. 
DAPHN J. HUANG 
Deputy ttorney General 
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